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homophobic because the evil lion is drawn and voiced
"effeminately"; and it is classist because it is, once
again, a story of the comings and goings of royalty,
life in the upper bourgeoisie-as if nothing of interest
could happen to a lowly member of the proletariat or
to someone lower on the food chain; as if no one would
care to see a movie entitled "The Lion Peasant" or "The
Slug King."
Wheilier or not we agree wiili such criticisms, once
voiced they inevitably affect our experience of the
movie in retrospect. The point I wish to bring up, iliough,
is not so much a criticism as it is a bit of confusion. I
was confused during "The Lion King" because I could
not understand why all of tJlese animals were so happy
iliat another lion had been born. After all, it won't be
long until Simba is hunting, killing, and eating most of
these creatures who are attending his presentation party
wiili such joy.
Some explanation is given a few minutes into the
film when Mufasa is showing Simba around the jungle
and explaining this "circle of life" of which everyone
was singing earlier. He tells Simba that even tJlough
tl1e lions eat the antelope, for instance, one day tl1e lions
will die and their bodies will decay, which will fertilize
the grass so that tl1e next generation of antelope will
have sometl1ing to eat. Everybody helps everybody else
in tl1e circle of life-it is a balanced community of
cooperative eating and being eaten.

I. Introduction: The Circle of Life

There is something intriguing about the opening scene
of tJle Walt Disney movie "The Lion King." It is not
just tJlat the animals are all speaking and singingtJlOugh the fact that nearly every Disney movie and so
many other shared stories and fables include animals
who have the ability to communicate their thoughts with
us must tell us something about the human psyche in
general. It is, rather, what the animals are singing.
Mufasa, tJle current lion king, has a new son named
Simba, and all oftJle animals of the jungle and the plains
are gathering so tJlat Simba can be introduced to them
in a customarily regal way. The animals sing about the
"circle of life," and they fall to their knees when the
new lion cub-the cub who will be king-is finally
presented to them, held aloft on a rock precipice
overlooking tJle kingdom.
Now, "The Lion King" has been accused of a
lawyer's-list of political correctness violations. It is,
supposedly, sexist because it focuses on the life of male
power-players; it is racist because the voices of the
nasty characters are done by minorities; it is
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At this point, I am afraid that I find myself in
agreement with Terrence Rafferty, film critic for the
New Yorker, who remarks that Mufasa's claim " 'We're
all connected' [through the eating chain is] ...easy for
him to say; it seems unlikely that the antelopes share
this philosophical serenity."j Indeed, one wonders if
the antelope consider this "circle of life" to be a
community at all; no doubt they would tell a different
story if they had the power of the narrative pen.
But this raises many important and interesting
questions. Is there such a thing as an animal community,
and if so, how are its members determined? How is
this community created and does it include humans?
Disney, of course, is just one inS!1l1lce of humanity's
tendency to anthropomorphize animals. In such stories
we tend to see projections of ourselves, and surely in
"The Lion King," the lions are "the humans of the
jungle." They have the power to speak for the rest, and
upon closer inspection Mufasa's speech about the
"circle of life" sounds very human, echoing the same
attitudes and philosophies which keep modem society
content with the institutions of pets, zoos, factory
farming and all of our carnivorous and exploitative
traditions in general.
Human communities and a human communitarian
ethic have existed for sometime. The former have
been studied and the latter have been debated
extensively. But little attention has been given to a
deeper sense of community-a community without
species boundaries-and to the ethic which might
result. I would like to propose that community is not
limited to human members. Communal membership
and, consequently, communitarian moral status extend
beyond the seemingly arbitrary boundaries of our
human societies and collectivities. My goal is to suggest
how this is so from tlle particular vantage point of
continental philosophy and, more specifically,
phenomenology-adiscipline which has much to say
on the subject.

Phenomenology's role in such an endeavor is, actually,
quite import1U1t. The traditional problem has been that
animals 3 seem incapable of possessing goods and
reflecting on their actions. To take a typical and often
quoted example, consider Aquinas' discussion of
irrational creatures:
Strictly speaking we cannot will goods to
irrational creatures because they cannot "have"
goods in the proper sense of the word
... [J]udgement is the power of one judging
insofar as he can judge about his own
judgement.. ..But to judge about one's own
judgement belongs only to reason which
reflects upon its own act. ... Hence, the whole
root of freedom is located in reason. 4
To this, Peter Drum adds the following interpretation. Aquinas, he argues, is suggesting that
irrational creatures are not proper goodpossessors... [because] they are not proper
beneficiaries of other-regarding acts ....The
point is that only rational beings are capable
of reflective awareness or self-consciousness:
They can be aware of being aware, Le., aware
of their own beliefs, thoughts andjudgements.5
It is helpful here to shift the focus of this inquiry
from questions concerning rationality-a loaded-term
often irrationally tossed about-to questions of
intentionality. After all, the problem seems to focusfor Aquinas and many others-on an animal's ability
for reflective awareness, the state of being aware of
being aware. In other words, animals are often left out
of the moral community of persons because it is
assumed that they have no phenomenologicallife-or
at least one to which we do not have access.
But is this fair? Initially, it seems straightforwardly
impossible to posit animal phenomenology, for the
whole idea of phenomenological analysis is that the
phenomenologist has access to his or her own
consciousness and experience and therefore has a
special and secure knowledge. I might not actually be
in my office right now as I write these words. I might
be hallucinating, tricked, or a brain in a vat, but there is
one thing of which I am sure: I am having the experience
of being in my office. It is a bit of secure knowledge
like no other. And by studying the structures of such

II. Possible Paths Toward Community:
Animal Phenomenology
There are several ways in which animal membership
in a communitarian ethic can be established. 2 The first
uses community in a somewhat loose way and seeks to
demonstrate that animals are individuals-that they
count as moral beings-and thus they are to be
considered members of the community of persons.
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experiences we can come to uncover the structures of
consciousness itself-the interplay of presence and
absence, the various modes of presentation of objects,
etc. The problem is that making claims about animal
experience seems to overstep the boundaries of
phenomenology. TIle practicing phenomenologist does
not have access to the experience of the animal and
thus cannot make claims as to its structure.
This is mistaken for a variety of reasons, not the
least of which is human arrogance and hubris. Why is
it that Husserl (or any other phenomenologist) would
think that phenomenology is valid for anyone but
themselves? That is, since I do not have access to the
consciousness of a Frenchman, why would I think that
I have the right to speak about structures of consciousness in Frenchmen? Naturally, because I must assume
a basic similarity between my own experience and the
experience of the Other. Nationality, race, class, and
.gender all surely affect one's horizon of experience,
yet the basic, generic structures of consciousness itself
must be assumed as a constant. But why stop here? Why
not allow species to be one characteristic of an
individual that affects the shape of her experience but
not the basic structure of that experience? The problem
is that we cannot have our cake and eat it too. If we do
not include animals in our phenomenology then we
should not include any Others. To put it another way,
in what sense do we not have access to animal
experience? One could argue that our experience is
fundamentally the experience of a living being, the
experience of an animal, and then the experience of a
human. Our humanity filters our world and alters our
horizon of possible experience, but it does not dictate
an exclusive structure to consciousness.
Yet, even if we assume that we do not have direct
access to animal consciousness and thus cannot speak
properly of animal phenomenology, it is possible that
such a phenomenology could be reconstructed. Husserl
never published on the notion of reconstructive
phenomenology in his lifetime, but the Nachlass texts
have scattered references. 6 Here, Husserl suggests
reconstructing what the intentional life of a human infant
must look like. The practicing phenomenologist has no
access to infantile consciousness-to burgeoning
human intentionality in its most early stages-but
Husserl suggests that we can reconstruct the structures
of such a wakeful life.
A similar story, then, could be told of animals.
Observing animal behavior we are quick to posit such
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structures as identity synthesis, the experience of
multi-sensory unities, presence and absence, etc. The
cat who waits for the mouse to re-emerge from the
hole in the floorboard seems to be presencing the
mouse as absent. The mouse was here before
(presenced as present) but he is not here now
(presenced as absent). If the mouse were not being
presenced as absent, the cat, we imagine, would not
be waiting and staring so intensely. Furthermore, the
dog who hears a noise and rushes to the door to growl
at the mailman seems to be experiencing the world as
made up of multi-sensory unities. The creak of the
mailbox lid being opened, footfalls on the porch, etc.
are auditory aspects related to a rich mUlti-sensory
unity-a unity for which the dog expects to have visual
confirmation when he rushes to the door. The mailman,
we conclude, is a unified collection of sounds and
images and smells, etc.
These are relatively important accomplishments, and
there seems to be no reason to refuse to believe that
most animals are in possession of rich intentional lives
and thus have the right to be thought of as individualspersons-within the moral community.7

II. Community through Commonality
But this is a community only in a libertarian and, I would
suggest, improper sense. A community, one might
argue, is not a collection of isolated monadic individuals
but, rather, a union of interrelated group-members
bound together by commonalties. If we work with this
notion of community, is it possible to argue that
nonhuman animal life can still claim membership?
What, in fact, do we have in common with animals that
might lead to the establishment of a community?
The ftrst and most obvious answer to this question
is that we share a common world and thus a common
future with animals. This is no startling claim. Our
interconnection with animals and the living world is,
in some sense, commonsensical, though it tends to be
obscured by our contemporary lifestyle-a way of
being-in-the-world such that our relatedness is
"suppressed."8 Hamburger does not come from a
grocery and spotted owls do not exist to play the role
of political pawns, no matter the degree to which the
world might appear so.
A common critique of such communitarian
foundations, though, is that we tend to include animals
in the community only to the degree to which they are
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important to and otherwise affect us. That is, animals
are added to our community as we grow to realize their
importance to human existence. Such an anthropocentric ethic does not sit well with deep ecologists
such as Dave Foreman, co-founder of Earth First!'
Foreman rejects such notions as "a huge failure of moral
imagination" and argues that "[a]ll living things have
intrinsic value, inherent worth .... They live for
themselves, for their own sakes, regardless of any real
or imagined value to human civilization."9
But there are many examples of non-anthropocentric
theories based on human and animal interconnections.
Some Native American world-views are excellent
examples of such theory and practice. John Mohawk's
important work in providing a communitarian reading
of the Iroquois Confederacy's oral tradition suggests
that the Six Iroquois Nations lived by a "deep
ecological" or "deep communal" rule where humans
are said to be in community with animals, plants,
rivers, air, etc. The laws of justice established by the
Six Nations covered not only the human citizens but
the other members of the community as well. Such a
form of communitarianism-a lived theory with a
long history before it was forcibly eradicated by
physically destroying its practitioners-is well worth
greater study.lO
And there are other approaches to community
through commonality. Alphonso Lingis' recent work
suggests that there is a "Community in Death" of which
humans and animals are members in virtue of the fact
that we are all mortal. ll This is intriguing because
species kinship plays no role in Lingis' view of
community-the Other, human or animal, shares a
connection to me when I put myself "wholly in the place
of the death that gapes open" for her. 12

[a]t whatever level or size or degree of
complexity, a community exists wherever a
narrative account exists of a we which has
continuous existence through its experiences
and activities. When we say that such an
account "exists," we mean to say that it gets
articulated or formulated, perhaps by only one
or a few of the group's members, in terms of
the we and is accepted or subscribed to by the
other members. It is their acceptance that
makes them members, [and] constitutes their
recognition of the others as fellow members....
To be a participant or member in this sense,
and to posit a we as group-subject of such a
communal story, are really the same thing. 13
One of the problems with such an account is that it
fails to recognize the power of the story-teller and thus
the possibility that certain characters in the communal
story are marginalized---even written-out. Carr suggests
that one's acceptance of the narrative makes one a
member of the "we." The point, at first, seems to be
well taken. I am quite sure that when the Ku Klux Klan
rallies under slogans such as "We believe in a white
America," the we fails to refer to me because I do not
accept a role in that narrative-the Ku Klux Klan story
is not my story.14 And the point can be made in less
extreme situations as well. When Native Americans or
Scandinavians or Buddhists speak of a "we" and tell a
story which is "ours," I know that the "we" does not
include me-these stories and thus these communities
are not mine.
But this is too simplistic. It is an inaccurate view of
the way narrative operates, because it takes for granted
the fact that I am free to choose the story in which I am
enmeshed. But is this so? If I hear someone say, "We
have become obsessed with O. J. Simpson," or if
President Clinton goes on television and declares "We
will not lift the Cuban embargo," in what sense am I
free to say that these "we" ,s do not include me? Whether
or not I agree with the Cuban embargo, am I not a part
of the story through my action and even inaction--does
this narrative not encompass me, with or without my
consent? Indeed, if Carr is correct, such stories not only
include me, they constitute me. I am what I am in virtue
of the "we" of the narratives in which I find myself
enmeshed. To assume otherwise is to posit an initial
state where humans are isolated individuals, picking
and choosing the narratives and thus communities in

Death, though, is only part of the story of our lives,
and perhaps it is the case that we share more of this
story-more than the final death scene-with animals.
Building a community on the foundation of a shared
story or the on-going process of narrative creation is
another communitarian tradition with a rich history.
Stanley Hauerwas, Alasdair MacIntyre, and David Carr
have written in this area, though none has dealt
extensively with the specific topic at hand-that of
determining the role of nonhuman animal life in the
creation of the stories which "inflate us to life" and
provide us with meaning.
Carr, for instance, has some insight into the role of
narrative in human communities. He suggests that
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which they wish to participate-a fundamentally noncommunitarian assumption of what it is to be human.
Consequently, communities, we must conclude, are not
always constituted through consent.
This point becomes especially clear when we
consider the role of animals in narrative. Clearly,
animals are part of "our" story. What we do affects
them; what they do affects us. In fact, this us/them
distinction is fundamentally misdirected, since the
narrative is common: humans and animals strut and
fret, acting out their parts in a common space, within
a common story. The difference is that animals do not
seem capable of validating the narrative which humans
construct for them. Recounting our history and
preparing for our future, we tell the stories of where
we have been and where we are going. We have spread
across the earth and cut trails through the land. We
have thinned the forests, and lawn-and-gardened the
soil, blackened the skies and spiked the water. We have
domesticated the tasty animals and attempted to
eradicate the pests. We have fought one another and
loved one another, and we hope to go on telling our
story for many more years.
But do we have this right? When we say, "Our
Hoover dam is a great dam-it would be best for us to
build some more," who are "we"? "We" certainly must
include the varieties of nonhuman animal life caught
up in the story. "We," in some sense, refers to this life,
but there is something improper about this reference
because it is always and only uttered by humans. The
"we" of such statements picks out human and animal
alike, but there is something inauthentic about the way
it does so to animals. Inevitably, we humans represent
animals in the common tale we construct, but we do it
willy-nilly. I 5
Is there any way around this, though? How can we
consider and represent animal perspectives when we
cannot hear animal voices? Some Deep Ecologists
would claim that this approach is misdirected from the
start because we have favored human stories and
overlooked the fact that the story we tell is one of many
concurrent tales, none more important than the rest in
the non-hierarchical structure of nature. Perhaps, it all
comes down to power-which the narrator has
absolutely. The story-teller casts the parts, sets the
scenes, and interprets the plotlines, and those unnamed
characters to which the "we" emptily refers have no
say in the matter-unless they rip the pen from the storyteller's hand and write their own account.

Between the Species

If we are to say, tllOugh, that there is a right to
revolution in narrative, and if we are to maintain that
"we" can be used improperly-that it has been used
improperly when we speak for the human and animal
community without allowing the voices of animals to
be heard and the goods of animals to be voiced-we
are left with a difficult situation. If the "we" refers
emptily, then we must assume that there is some more
appropriate "we"-some more proper communitythan the one which the narrative "we" picks out and,
supposedly, creates. In other words, if the narrative
"we" constitutes the community, how can it ever be
wrong? To what standard could we appeal when we
offer our critique?
IV. Phenomenology and Deep Community

Here is where the true force of phenomenology's
response is to be felt, for there is a more foundational
level of community than that which is brought into being
through narrative-there is a more basic "we" which
can be disclosed through phenomenological analysis.
In Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation, he
suggests that I never experience myself as an isolated,
monadic individual but, rather, as a self among Others.
In fact, the Ego and the Other are constituted in unison
and in conjunction with the network of Others which
forms my community. As the Ego arises in sense, so
does the Other, and this fundamental presence of the
Other founds my experience of the world as public.
Such phenomenological truths become evident,
Husserl maintains, when we attempt to perform a
"reduction to a sphere of ownness.'.' "As regards
methods," he explains,
a prime requirement for proceeding correctly
here is that first of all we carry out, inside the

universal transcendental sphere. a peculiar
kind of epochi... [where] we disregard all
constitutional effects ofintentionality relating
immediately or mediately to other subjectivity
and delimit first of all the total nexus of that
actual and potential intentionality in which the
ego constitutes within himself a peculiar
owness. [sic] Buthere something remarkable
strikes us: The psychic life of my Ego
.. .including my whole world-experiencing life
and therefore including my actual and possible
experience of what is other, is wholly
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unaffected by screening off what is other. . .1,
the reduced "human Ego"... am constituted,
accordingly, as a member of the "world"... 16

To be members of a mixed community is to share a
world, but more than this, it is to acknowledge that the
appearing world is this shared world-a common world
on which humans and animals have different
perspectives. Intersubjective Goods, then, are one aspect
of this public world. In the same way that I take the
Hoover dam to be a public object-i.e., in the same
way that I take my perspective here to be a perspective
on the same object which you have a perspective on
over there-so, too, are Goods necessarily public. What
I take to be good from my perspective, you can take to
be good or bad from yours. The same action that a
human considers good is good or bad from an animal
perspective as well.
This is a strong claim. Itamount~ to more than saying
that what we do affects each other, animals included. It
is to say that our shared community is essentially
soaked with morality. Robert Sokolowski has put the
point succinctly:

In other words, if we attempt to strip the layers of
experience until we arrive at a foundational level where
the experience does not reiy on the presence of what is
alien or other (Le., we uncover the sphere of ownness),
we discover that the project is an immediate failure.
Even the most basic experience of my own Ego is
dependent on the Other; we necessarily live in an
intersubjective world.
Now, what if we alter this argument in an attempt
to uncover the poinLat which animals make their
appearance in our experience? That is, we would
attempt "a reduction to a sphere of human-ownness"stripping away any experience of what is nonhuman
in an effort to uncover some foundational level of
experience which does not include the experience of
nonhuman animal life and is in no way dependent on
such life for its meaning.
Attempting such a reduction we are once again
struck by something remarkable. Even at the most
fundamental level of experience, we find the presence
of the animal-Other. The world, that is, is experienced
as a common world-a world in which the human and
the nonhuman animal necessarily acknowledge a mutual
publicity. We cannot screen off or strip away the animalOther, for it would mean stripping away our own
humanity and even our ability-the possibility of our
ability-to have experience.
In many ways, this phenomenological fact is born
out by empirical evidence as well. Mary Midgley
speaks of a "well-filled stage," populated by members
of "the mixed community," and maintains that "[a]1I
human communities have involved animals."l7 Such
anthropological/sociological evidence cannot count as
phenomenological proof, but it is consistent with our
phenomenological findings. Thus, when Kenneth
Shapiro claims, in the editor's introduction to the first
issue of Society and Animals, that there is a
"pervasiveness" of animals in our life and that "our
world is... replete with animals in the street, home,
nursing home, consulting room, at the 'feeder,' in the
city alley and city park, ... on the farm, in the stream, in
the wild,',18 he speaks to the obvious truth of a
communal world-the obvious historical-empirical fact
that there is no such thing as a human conununity that
is not in the midst of allimals,l9
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We have no choice about adopting the moral
point of view. We exist morally not by virtue
of a decision, but by virtue of the fact that we
share a world with other agents, and that what
seems good to us will usually show up as good
or bad to others, that as good or bad for others
it can be good or bad for us, that there can
consequently be both conflicts and harmonies
in the intersection of goods and bads.... [T]hat
is the way we are ... we are moral by the way
we exist with others. 20
Morality, then, is not a choice but a way of being in
the world. Our good is tied up with the goods of those
with whom we share the world; indeed, these goods
are not actually separate goods but are perspectives on
a common Good. It is phenomenologically impossible
to suppress this publicity-to suppress our moral
connection with the living world-though many of our
actions and most past philosophical ethics do not begin
with this proper foundation.
Our community is a deep one, and I would like to
use this term, Deep Community, to refer to the
collectivity uncovered and the common Goods
disclosed through phenomenological analysis. The
Deep Community is one in which animals claim full
membership and animal goods stand at the same level
as human goods. Many deep ecological claims are at
home in such a tlleory, for animal status and worth is
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not dependent on an animal's usefulness to humanity
or on our granting such status and worth to animals.
Indeed, Deep Community "gets underneath" anthropomorphism, showing how such a mistake is possible
and explaining the necessary preconditions and
assumptions resting behind its faulty reasoning.
Anthropomorphism is a privileging of the human
perspective on the Good and it is fundamentally
contradictory-both (a) in the sense that it must
recognize the publicity of the common Good while at
the same time characterizing this common Good as a
human good and (b) in that anthropomorphic theories
attempt to account for the presence of the animal-Other
in terms that are wholly familiar and "of the Self."21
Deep Community, then, dictates a Deep Communiurrianism. We can come to a better understanding of
our duties and of who "we" are through the variety of
ways I have been discussing. We learn more about each
other-about the phenomenological life of animals, for
instance-and we learn something about the way in
which the Good appears from the perspective of the
Other. We uncover what we have in common-a life, a
death, and a destiny-and we tell our stories of
commonality, our narratives which further define who
"we" are, where we have been, and where the "circle
of life"-now understood in its deep and rich sensewill lead us next.

Extent of Our Moral Enmeshment" in Proceedings of the
Second Conference on Persons, forthcoming 1995.
8 The fact that relatedness cannot actually be suppressed
will be a topic for us later.

9 Steve Chase, ed. Defending the Earth: A Dialogue
Between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman. (Boston:
South End Press, 1991), pp. 115-16.
10 Cf. John Mohawk's, "The Great Law of Peace," in
Communitarianism: A New Public Ethics, Markate Daly, ed.
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994).
11 See Alphonso Lingis' The Community of Those Who
Have Nothing in Common (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1994). Though I am not in agreement with
most of Lingis' claims here, his work on community is
important and speaks to the relevance and importance of
continental thought 011 this topic.

12 Lingis

(1994), p. 157.

13 David Carr, Time, Narrative, and History (Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 163.
14 Indeed, I refuse to validate the view of the world inherent
in that narrative.

15 One might consult James Hart's The Person and the
Common Life (Dordrecht Kluwer, 1992), for more on this
notion of all inauthentic "we." See, especially, pp. 264-74,
414-16,458-62. Hart has worked out this theme in great detail,
and much of wbat be bas accomplished can be applied to tbe
task at band. Tbougb animal "we" 's are not an explicit tbeme
in The Person and the Common Life, the subject is toucbed
on: "If we adopt the view that animals are monads, and
therefore inherently entitled to respect we may not regard them
as goods for humanity but as members of the monadic
community, i.e., of tbe 'we' and 'us' to wbom the world
appears and for whom the goods are." (458)

Notes
1 Terrence Rafferty, "The Current Cinema," New Yorker,
June 20,1994, p. 88.
2 Established" is probably not the best word here.
"Uncovered" or "disclosed" might be more accurate.

3 I begin to use "animal" for "nonhuman animal" here
for aesthetic reasons.

16 Edmund Husser!. Cartesian Meditations. Dorion Caims,
trans. (Dordrecbt: Martinus Nijboff, 1988), pp. 92-99.

4 Aquinas, Summa T71eologica, IIaIIae, 25, 3 (London:
Blackfriars, 1963-75), and De Veritate, 24, 2 (Chicago:
Regnery, 1952-54).

17 Mary Midgley, "The Mixed Community," The Animal
RightslEnvironmental Ethics Debate, Eugene C. Hargrove,
ed. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992), p. 211.

5 Peter Drum, "Aquinas and the Moral Status ofAnimals,"
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly vol. LXVI,
no. 4. pp. 483-5.

18 Kenneth Shapiro, "Editor's Introduction," Society and
Animals vo!. 1,110. 1, p. 1.

6

19 Of course, there is tbe possibility that a "human
community" might rise up without animals, but we would
not want to call this a "human community" in tbe same way
that the term is used today. Just as there can be a feral cbilda cbi1d that never develops a full buman ego because it is
raised without the presence of the buman-Other--so tbere

See, especially, Husserliana XV, pp. 608-610.

7 Much more needs to be said here, but it goes beyond the
scope of this essay. For more on the notion of animal
phenomenology, one might consult my "The Boundaries of
the Phenomenological Community: Non-Human Life and the
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can be a feral human community. Such a community would
not possess the same qualities or identity as a fully human
community (which is in the presence of the animalcommunity). For more on this, one might consult my "The
Boundaries of the Phenomenological Community" and 'The
Familiar Other and Feral Selves" (work in progress).

We have already touched on this subject, though, and must
maintain that there is no reason to limit the publicity of the
world to human agents.
21 i.e., such theories are phenomenologically contradictory in that they must presence the animal-Other as subject
(this is the necessary precondition for having human
experience; recall the reduction to a sphere of humanownness) and as object (capable of being objectified, defined,
and used by the human subject).

20 Robert Sokolowski, Pictures, Quotations, and
Distinctions (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1992),
p. 256. Sokolowski does not extend this moral interconnection
to animals because he does not see them as "moral agents."
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